The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine's theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine's theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism and realism: Universals and Scientific realism (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). In the present paper, I propose an alternative framework that accounts for the phenomena that Quine intends to explain with his resemblance theory. The framework agrees with Quine's austere ontology; in particular, it does not assume the existence of properties and of possible worlds. (I will mention below Quine's reason for rejecting properties and possible worlds. For a theory of Universals that assumes possible worlds, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.) Moreover, the framework is extensionalist since the abstract entities it assumes are classes and these can be individuated extensionally, for classes are identical if their members are identical. Finally, I will refute some of the objections to Quine's approach that have been raised by Armstrong and Oliver [(1996). The metaphysics of properties. Mind, 105, 1-80.] and I will argue that, contrary to what has been claimed by Oliver in a comment on Lewis [(1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.], Quine is able to specify an important set of sparse properties.
N. Stemmer

Properties and Meanings
In his well known paper 'On what there is ' (1953a) , Quine gives a succinct account of his position on Universals:
The words 'houses', 'roses' and 'sunsets' are true of sundry individual entities which are houses and roses and sunsets, and the word 'red' or 'red object' is true of each sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word 'redness' nor, for that matter, by the word 'househood', 'rosehood', 'sunsethood'. That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible (1953a, p. 10).
Quine is arguing in this passage that although we can form linguistic expressions such as 'redness' and 'househood', there are no entities, usually called attributes or properties, which are named by the expressions. The reason is that since "we have no clue as to the circumstances under which attributes may be said to be the same or different" (Quine 1969a, p. 19), attributes or properties have no clear principle of individuation; they are intensionalist entities. Therefore, the ontological status of properties is rather dubious. (I use 'properties' for both attributes and properties.) Moreover, since we can replace sentences that mention properties by paraphrases that only assume entities that do have clear principles of individuation, there is no need to assume the existence of properties. Therefore, considerations of parsimony-the scientist's "taste for desert landscapes" (Quine 1953a, p. 4)-suggest doing science without assuming the existence of such "twilight half-entities" (Quine 1969a, p. 23). 1 To be sure, Quine does accept the existence of abstract classes since they are needed for formulating "a modern scientific system of the world" (Quine 1980, p. 450). Moreover, classes have a clear principle of individuation because "classes are identical when they have the same members" (Quine 1953b, p. 107) . Therefore, Quine accepts classes. Notice however that since classes are usually treated as Universals, Quine's position is not a strict nominalistic one and he explicitly admits this when stating that he is "a deep-dyed realist of abstract universals" (1980, p. 451) .
Quine thus rejects the existence of properties and he is not impressed by the fact that we can form expressions such as 'redness' or 'househood'. Linguistic usages do not decide ontological issues since we can replace the intensionalist sentences by extensionalist paraphrases. However, Quine does consider the argument that predicates such as 'red' have meanings and since meanings are supposed to be properties, it would follow that we must assume the existence of properties in order to account for the meanings of predicates. Quine's reply to this argument is that he refuses to admit meanings. To be sure, he does agree that linguistic utterances may be meaningful (for a person or for a verbal community). But this is an empirical phenomenon that should be treated scientifically and he proposes to analyze it in terms "directly of what people do in the presence of the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to it" (1953a, p. 11). Quine also agrees that expressions can be
